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Prison Litigation and District Court’s Effect
on the Electoral Process
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON*
I was likely invited here because of my involvement in litigation
concerning the California prison system; two of the cases I was involved
in sought significant social change. The first case, Coleman v. Wilson,1
deals with the problem of providing adequate care for the mentally ill
who are in prison. This is an extraordinarily complex problem, exempli-
fied by the fact that the case was decided over twenty-five years ago,
and we are still working out the resolution today. The second case came
while I was a member of a three-judge court that was convened under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act.2
First, we should discuss the issue of how to litigate cases concern-
ing significant social change. To begin with, judges do not go out and
find cases that they think would lead to socially desirable ends. Instead,
they sit in court and wait until a case shows up in front of them. More-
over, my district, like most every district in the United States Courts, has
elaborate rules that seek to avoid forum shopping.3 That is not to say
that dedicated lawyers cannot get to the judge that they think will have
some sympathy toward their position, but it is to say that getting to said
judge requires great resourcefulness.
There are some significant differences in prison litigation, because
* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California. Judge Karlton
originally delivered these remarks during Panel II, entitled The Past and Future of Structural
Reform, at the University of Miami Law Review’s 2014 Symposium, Leading from Below. See
2014 Symposium, U. MIAMI L. REV., http://lawreview.law.miami.edu/2014-symposium/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2014). These remarks have been edited for publication.
1. 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
2. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885, 918 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
3. See, e.g., Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 25, 54 (2005) (“Judge made rules have . . . developed in order to combat forum
shopping. . . . Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second Circuit has written . . . ‘Forum shopping is to
be discouraged and litigants generally ought not to have the option of selecting a particular judge
to adjudicate one-judge motions.’”) (quoting Rios v. Wigen, 863 F.2d 196, 199 n.1 (2d Cir.
1988)); cf. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990) (“[In] Van Dusen [we] sought to
fashion a rule that would not create opportunities for forum shopping. . . . [T]his meant that we
could not allow defendants to use a transfer to change the law.”) (referring to Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964)). In an effort to prevent future forum shopping by plaintiff’s
after they had already filed suit, “the Supreme Court rul[ed in Ferens] that when a transfer
initiated by a plaintiff occurs, the transferor court’s choice-of-law rules apply.” Maloy, supra at
36. For a number of examples of when federal courts have and have not allowed various forms of
forum shopping, see id. at 33–60.
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of its relationship to the aim of social change, as compared to other areas
of the law. The American system of justice is a system ultimately struc-
tured to deal with disputes between individuals, and the questions to be
resolved are questions of application of law to those individual cases.
But litigation that looks toward significant social change is really quite
different because it deals with questions of systemic failure, not of indi-
vidual failure.
One realization I have come to over the many years that I have
been involved in these kinds of cases is one that many lawyers have not
yet come to grips with: that the function of plaintiffs’ lawyers is really to
demonstrate systemic failure, while the function of the defense lawyers
is to demonstrate errors, mistakes, and even bad people. But individual
errors, mistakes, and bad people do not result in the kinds of judgments
that provide mental health services to prisoners.
Let me say something else that I have experienced, and I cannot
imagine any judge in my position that has not experienced it. It is self-
evident that, if you are a lawyer and you have an important question or
issue of fact, your first duty is to sit down and ask yourself, “how do I
assure that this evidence is admissible?”
The district judge, however, has a very different job. His question,
assuming that the plaintiffs prevail, is “how to structure his opinion so
that it will survive appellate review.” In a circuit such as mine, where
there are approximately thirty court of appeals judges,4 this becomes
very difficult. Ultimately, what you are left with is narrowly structuring
the opinion based on the very complex facts that have been generated in
the lawsuit.
The Wilson judgment ultimately determined that the provision of
mental healthcare to persons in California’s prisons was so insufficient
that it violated the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.5 In that case,
I appointed a special master.6 His first job was to work with the prison
authorities to develop a program guide, which would ultimately resolve
itself into a satisfaction of the constitutional violations that had been
found. His second job was to implement it. The first job was relatively
easy, especially when examined in light of the extraordinary difficulty of
the second job. The reasons for that difficulty are extremely complex. At
least in part, though, the problem in California and throughout the coun-
try is that we no longer have adequate care for the severely mentally ill.7
4. Active Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. FOR
NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/ninthcircuit/active_senior_judges.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2014).
5. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1323.
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
7. See Anasseril E. Daniel, Care of the Mentally Ill in Prisons: Challenges and Solutions, 35
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What we do, instead, is we criminalize mental illness. About a third of
the prisoners in California’s prisons are persons suffering from serious
mental illness.8 And if that does not worry us, it ought to.
In Wilson, the federal court was effectively requiring the State to
alter its procedures and laws. Part of the problem that arises in this situa-
tion is the nature of the confrontation. This is a democracy, and those
being ordered to change their behavior are elected officials, or at least
officials appointed by elected officials. Put another way, orders of
judges whose tenure is not subject to periodic approval by the citizenry
are issued to elected officials. In some sense, the democratic process is
being frustrated. Let me assure you that elected officials recognize that
fact and either purport to, or actually do, deeply resent such orders.9 But,
the older I get and the more I have been in this business, I cannot help
but admire the wisdom of the founders. They recognized that there were
certain fundamental rights, which the citizenry just could not override,
and then they created a system to ensure those rights by having
unelected judges.10 But the inevitable, anti-democratic posture of such
orders requires judges to act with discretion and awareness of the partic-
ular character of their relationship to the elected officials. I know there
are elected officials in California who do not think that I believe that,11
but I do. I believe that it is important for judges to recognize their rela-
tionship to the elected official, and, at the same time, recognize their
obligation to the Constitution of the United States. And that is not an
easy balance to strike.
Having at least briefly talked about the difficulties that federal
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 406, 406–09 (2007); NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
GRADING THE STATES 23–46 (2009), available at http://www.nami.org/gtsTemplate09.cfm?Sec
tion=Findings&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=75255.
8. See CAL. CORR. STANDARDS AUTH., JAILS AND THE MENTALLY ILL: ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
3–4 (2009), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/comio/docs/mentally_ill_in_jails_paper%20.pdf
(stating that approximately one-third of California prison inmates were subjected to a mental
health query); Council on Mentally Ill Offenders, Incarcerated Mentally Ill: A Growing Issue in
California, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/comio/Legislation.html (last
visited July 6, 2014) (discussing the rising percentage of people with severe mental illness as a
proportion of the population in California state prisons); Press Release, Bureau of Just. Stat.,
Study Finds More than Half of All Prison and Jail Inmates Have Mental Health Problems (Sept. 6,
2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/mhppjipr.cfm.
9. A paradigmatic example of this is the reaction of many states to Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1957), which mandated the racial desegregation of public schools. See
generally Molly Townes O’Brien, Brown on the Ground: A Journey of Faith in Schooling, 35 U.
TOL. L. REV. 813, 814 (2004) (describing many southern states’ campaigns of “massive
resistance” to Brown).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
11. Sam Stanton & Denny Walsh, Major Progress Cited in Prison Inmate Care,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 12, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/ar
ticle4746207.html.
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judges face when confronted with issues of significant public change, let
me turn for a moment to the nature of the three-judge court.
As you may know, the three-judge court was the creation of Con-
gress in 1995 when it passed the so-called Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”).12 Under that statute, when a district judge determines that a
constitutional violation in a state prison system exists, and it relates to
overcrowding, the judge may request the convening of a three-judge
court to determine whether or not the judges should issue an order
reducing the population of the prisons.13 Before that can occur, under the
PLRA, the three-judge court must determine that overcrowding was the
primary cause of the constitutional violation14 and must then issue an
order narrowly prescribed to relieve the overcrowded condition.15
As you may or may not know, there are two cases in California
dealing with the provision of medical care in prisons. The first is mine,
Coleman v. Brown (previously referred to as Wilson), and the other is
Plata v. Brown.16 Plata is the responsibility of my colleague in the
Northern District, Thelton Henderson.17 In that case, then-governor
Schwarzenegger issued a public declaration of emergency in the prison
system because of overcrowding.18 That declaration was required in
order to move California prisoners out of the state prison system and
into private prisons. This was a prerequisite to the lawyers in both Cole-
man and Plata bringing a request for a three-judge court. I believe that I
was the first judge who had to decide whether to request the formation
of a three-judge court. My first response was to continue that matter for
six months to see if the state officials could solve their problem; Judge
Henderson followed suit by also issuing a six-month stay.19 At the end
12. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 103-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat.
1321-66 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B)–(E) (2012).
14. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E) (“The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release order only if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . crowding is the primary cause of the
violation of a Federal right . . . .”).
15. Id. § 3626(a)(1) (“Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions
shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular
plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court
finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right.”).
16. Coleman v. Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 959 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Plata v. Schwarzenegger,
556 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
17. Plata, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; see also Senior District Judge Thelton E. Henderson, U.S.
DISTRICT CT. N.D. CALIF., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/teh (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
18. Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, OFF. GOVERNOR EDMOND G.
BROWN JR., http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
19. See Order Re: Defendants’ January 7, 2013 Motion to Vacate or Modify at 2, Coleman v.
Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 2:90-cv-0520), available at http://www.
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of the six months, it was clear that the State could not or would not solve
the problem, and so both Judge Henderson and I requested the formation
of the three-judge court.20 That request went to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. We indicated that it would be wise for the three-judge court
to have the both of us on it so as to avoid multiple litigation and the
possibility of conflicting judgments. Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Cir-
cuit was appointed as the third judge on the case. Thus, a three-judge
court was convened.21 We were the very first court of that sort to come
into existence, and so we sort of made up the process as we went along.
That process may have ramifications throughout the rest of the country.
However, I think that the institution of three-judge courts ought to be
relatively rare because of the very stringent conditions for it to be able to
issue an order.
In any event, the initial defendants were the Governor and the Sec-
retary of the California Department of Corrections, now Corrections and
Rehabilitation—but, even if you call a cat a dog, it is still a cat. Anyway,
we had a significant number of motions to intervene: the Republican
members of the California legislature as a body intervened, we had a
large number of district attorneys and sheriffs who sought to intervene
on the part of the defendants, and we had a motion to intervene by the
prison guard’s union, who moved to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs
because it was their position that the conditions were so serious that not
only were inmates in danger, but the prison guards were also in dan-
ger.22 All of those motions were granted, and we then undertook trial.
The trial took fourteen days. I would like to tell you all about it, but
we would be here all day if I did. I will tell you that at the end of it, the
three-judge court issued a 184-page decision.23 The court first found that
the crowding was a primary cause of the underlying Eighth Amendment
violations, and that no relief other than an order limiting the number of
cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/1192/2013-01-29%20order%20re%20motion%20to%20modify.pdf
(“[T]his Court modifies the June 30, 2011 Order by [granting] defendants a six-month extension
in which to comply with its terms and provisions.”); see also Plata v. Brown, No. C01-1351 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 29, 2013).
20. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Convene Three-Judge Court at 10, Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, No. C 01-1351-TEH, 2007 WL 2122657, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007).
21. Solomon Moore, New Court to Address California Prison Crowding, N.Y. TIMES (July
24, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/us/24calif.html?_r=0.
22. Trial Transcript at 33, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 01-1351-TEH, 2008 WL 8633587
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2008) (“[California Correctional Peace Officers Associations (“CCPOA”)]
intervened in this case . . . because of the massive overcrowding in our prisons, which is
exacerbated by chronic understaffing and dilapidated facilities[.] California’s prisons present an
increasingly unsafe working condition for staff and unsafe custody conditions for inmates.”).
23. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885–87 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (table of
contents for opinion and order).
382 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:377
prisoners would resolve the constitutional violations.24 And that the
order, as required by the statute, was narrowly drawn, was the least
intrusive remedy, and extended no further than necessary to address the
overcrowding.25 The court also, as required by statute, examined the
impact of such an order on public safety and the criminal justice system,
finding that neither of those considerations would contraindicate the
order that we proposed to issue.26
The State appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court, as
provided for by the statute, and that Court ultimately affirmed the three-
judge court’s determination in Brown v. Plata.27 That order was issued
on May 23, 2011, and, if you are as naı¨ve as I was, you would have
assumed that that would have been the end of the issue and that the
court’s determination that the prison system should be limited to 137.5%
of designed capacity would be obeyed.28 How foolish. In reality, what
happened afterwards demonstrates the difficulty of the political problem
as separate from the legal problem.
The first thing that happened was that the State moved in my case,
Coleman, to terminate and dismiss the action pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(b)29—and more attempts by the State to avoid the judgment are
likely on their way. It is a funny problem, and I want to talk a little bit
about this. I have the sense that no one reads the opinion or cares; I am
not even sure litigants read them. You know, judges write opinions
because that is what we do. In any case, the question presented by the
State’s motion was “has the State achieved constitutional satisfaction?”
The State has in the past twenty years made huge progress, and that is
not an exaggeration—huge progress. But, when you start from behind
your own end zone and you make great progress, you wind up at the 50-
yard line. That is the real world. And to say “yes you have made great
progress” and then “you’re done” is not right—you are not done.
The motion was denied on April 5, 2013.30 End of the story? No.
Then there was a motion before the three-judge court to vacate or mod-
ify the population reduction order, and that was denied in another long
opinion on April 11, 2013.31 That decision ordered the defendants to
stop delaying and to obey the order, and it ordered the State to file a plan
24. Id. at 949.
25. Id. at 962.
26. Id. at 970–99.
27. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011).
28. See id. at 1944 (“The three-judge court concluded that the population of California’s
prisons should be capped at 137.5% of design capacity. This conclusion is supported by the
record.”).
29. Coleman v. Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 955, 959 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
30. Id. at 955, 990.
31. Coleman v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1004, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
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with the court explaining how they were going to go about it.32 They
filed a nonconforming plan, and that resulted in a further issue for the
three-judge court.33 You might wonder why, by now, we had not issued
an order to show cause and contempt, but if you go back to my initial
position which is to recognize the very complex difficulty of federal
judges ordering state elected officials to do their duty, you can see why
that order would be a last resort.
That is where we stood when the political process took over and the
state legislature passed a statute that basically said that the State was
going to spend a lot of money in attempting to solve the problem of
recidivism, which is one of the very serious reasons for overcrowding of
California prisons, if you can give us two years.34 I am not telling tales
out of school when I tell you that the three judges had a great deal of
difficulty with this proposition because what we needed to do was not
simply to reduce the population to 137.5%; we needed a durable solu-
tion, one that was going to last long after we were gone. The State was
at least suggesting a significant step in that direction. Ultimately, we
issued an order in February of 2014, which approved of the State’s two
year plan, but only upon the State’s representation that they will not
appeal two additional orders: one, the appointment of a compliance
officer who would have the authority to release people if the State did
not meet the population reduction goals that were established, and, two,
that the State would not appeal any orders of the three-judge court aris-
ing out of the existence of the compliance officer.35 There are going to
be people who say you seriously undermine the litigation process by
restricting the ability of people to ask for review of legal decisions, but
our own experience has been that the appeals have essentially been to
delay compliance with the order, and our view is that the State, having
proposed this solution, should have at least some difficulty the next time
they attempt to appeal.
I think I want to close by saying that I do not know very much
about other kinds of litigation that involve such profound effects upon
the electoral process. I have done many water cases, which are very
important in California, and they have significant effects upon where
32. See id. at 1049–54.
33. See id. at 1014–22.
34. See MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2014–15 BUDGET:
ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO PRISON OVERCROWDING ORDER 1–17 (2014), available at http://
www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/budget/three-judge-panel/three-judge-panel-022814.pdf; Bob
Egelko, Court Gives California Two Years to Lower Prison Population, SFGATE (Feb. 11, 2014,
1:49 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Court-gives-California-2-years-to-lower-prison-
5221828.php.
35. Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014); see also Plata v. Brown,
No. C01-1351 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014).
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people live, what people do for a living, what the rivers look like, and so
forth.36 But there is, at least in my opinion, nothing that compares with
the difficulties that have been generated by these two cases.
Thank you very much.
36. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1534–43 (E.D. Cal.
1991).
